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BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici Curiae, The Utah Taxpayers Association and The Utah 
Manufacturers Association, appearing through their attorneys Kent 
W. Winterholler and Maxwell A. Miller of and for Parsons Behle & 
Latimer, hereby respectfully submit their Brief in support of Eaton 
Kenway, Inc. ("Eaton"), that the decision of The Utah State Tax 
Commission (the "Commission"), wherein the Commission denied Eaton 
a sales and use tax exemption under the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (Supp. 1993), should be reversed. The Utah 
Taxpayers Association is a statewide association of businesses and 
other taxpayers in Utah with approximately 2,000 members. The Utah 
Manufacturers Association is a statewide association of 
manufacturers and related businesses employing more than 84,000 
employees out of approximately 115,000 workers employed in 
manufacturing industries in Utah. 
STATEMENT OF COURT'S JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this Petition for 
Review of a final decision of the Commission under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1993) and Utah Code Ann. § 78 - 2-2 (3) (e) (ii) 
(Supp. 1993) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The only issue presented for review which this Amicus brief 
will address is: Did the Commission err when it concluded that 
Eaton's purchase of machinery and equipment for use in Eaton's 
12083"7 
manufacturing operation did not qualify for exemption from sales 
and use tax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15)? 
The critical language in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15), upon 
whose meaning a resolution of the above-stated issue turns, is 
"normal operating replacements." Amici submit that the Commission 
has not been granted discretion to define these terms.1 
If this court agrees that Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) does 
not grant the Commission discretion to define "normal operating 
replacements," the standard of review of the Commission's decision 
is correction of error under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1) (b) (Supp. 
1993) . 
If this court concludes that Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) 
grants the Commission discretion to define "normal operating 
replacements," the standard of review is the reasonableness of the 
Commission's interpretation and application of those terms. The 
1
 The statutory language relating to "normal operating replacements" 
states- "excluding normal operating replacements, which includes replacement 
machinery and equipment even though they may increase plant production or 
capacity, as determined by the commission." Grammatically, the words "as 
determined by the commission" modify the words "increase plant production or 
capacity" and not "normal operating replacements." See, 2A Sutherland Statutory 
Construction § 47.33 (4th ed rev 1984) ("Referential and qualifying words and 
phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last 
antecedent ") See, also Webster's Legal Secretaries Handbook 258 (1981) ("In 
order to achieve maximum clarity and to avoid the possibility that the reader 
will misinterpret what he reads, one should place a modifying clause as close as 
possible to the word or words it modifies ") See, also Jensen v City and County 
of Denver, 806 P.2d 381, 385 (Colo 1991), Taylor v Perdition Minerals Group, 
Ltd , 766 P.2d 805, 810 (Kan 1988), Harris Trust & Savings Bank v Mack, 364 
N.E.2d 349, 354 (111. App 3d 1977) Since the Legislature uses words 
"advisedly," Savage Industries Inc v Utah State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d 664, 
670 (Utah 1991) , it must also be assumed, given a possibility of different 
constructions, that the grammatically correct usage was intended 
2 
Commission's interpretation and application of the law will not be 
upheld if the court determines the Commission's action is 
unreasonable, constituting an abuse of discretion. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) (1993), Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n of Utah. 
842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992) and Albertsons, Inc. v. Department of 
Employment Security. 854 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1993). 
The Commission's application of Rule R865-19-85S to require 
satisfaction of a "new products" test for exemption eligibility, 
when there is no such test contemplated or required under the rule, 
raises a pure issue of law which should be reviewed for 
correctness. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(b) (Supp. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 (Sup. 1993). This statute is 
reproduced in full in the addendum. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (Supp. 1993). This 
statute is reproduced in full in the addendum. 
3. Rule 865-19-85S of the Utah Administrative Code. This 
rule is reproduced in full in the addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case, course of proceedings/ and disposition in 
the agency below. 
This appeal is a Petition for Review of the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision of the Commission in Eaton 
Kenway, Inc. v. The Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission, Utah Tax Commission Appeal No. 92-1732. The Petition 
for Review was brought pursuant to the provisions of Rule 14 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The formal hearing decision 
from which Eaton appealed sustained a sales and use tax audit by 
the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission (the 
"Division") for the period April, 1989 through March, 1992. In 
this audit the Division assessed sales and use taxes upon Eaton's 
purchase of a computer numerically controlled ("CNC") cutting, 
drilling and tapping machine tool. Eaton disagreed with the 
Division's assessment and requested a formal hearing before the 
Commission. 
At the formal hearing, Eaton asserted that it did not owe the 
additional sales and use tax the Division assessed because Eaton's 
purchase of its CNC machine constituted the purchase of machinery 
by a qualified manufacturer for use in a new or expanding 
manufacturing facility. As such, the purchase was exempt from 
sales and use taxes under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (Supp. 
1993). The Commission rejected this assertion, holding that the 
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purchase did not meet the "new or expanding operations" criteria 
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15), supra. and Rule 865-19-85S of 
the Utah Administrative Code. The Commission specifically held: 
With respect to Petitioner's purchase of the 
CNC machine, the Tax Commission finds that 
this purchase does not qualify for tax 
exemption pursuant to Utah statutes and the 
administrative rules previously cited. 
Specifically, this purchase failed to meet the 
"new or expanding operations" criteria which 
are narrowly construed. 
The CNC machine was not a part of 
manufacturing, processing or assembling 
activities which are substantially different 
in nature, character, or purpose from Eaton 
Kenway's prior activities. Petitioner 
manufactured the same type of product both 
before and after the purchase of the CNC 
machine. The product produced by the CNC 
machine was the same make, only a different 
model. 
This specific equipment purchase was a normal 
operating replacement only and, therefore, 
cannot qualify for sales tax exemption. 
Simply stated, the manufacturer's sales tax 
exemption does not extend to purchases such as 
this one where a manufacturer has merely 
bought the latest technologically improved 
machine to help it compete in its same field 
of business. 
Record at 42-43. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
All facts recited in this Brief are taken directly from the 
Commission's Findings of Fact which were entered on December 22, 
1993. 
120837 5 
1. Eaton qualifies as a manufacturing facility as described 
in SIC Codes 2000 to 3999 of the Standard Industrial Classification 
Manual. Eaton therefore met the initial requirement for the sales 
and use tax exemption of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15), supra. 
Eaton is a manufacturer of automated guide vehicle systems ("AGVs") 
and storage/retrieval vehicles ("SRVs"). These mechanical vehicle 
systems and units are typically used in a warehouse setting and 
will move products from one place to another by remote computer 
operation. These AGVs and SRVs are capable of storing and 
retrieving heavy items at and from great heights. They perform 
forklift-type maneuvers with great accuracy, proficiency and speed. 
Record at 34. 
2. In 1988, Eaton determined that in order to properly 
compete with its competitors in its field it would be necessary for 
it to develop new and better product systems. Eaton therefore 
designed improved and more desirable AGVs and SRVs, with new 
engineering specifications. After developing its new product line, 
Eaton determined that it would have to revise and revamp its 
machine center in order to produce its new AGV and SRV product 
line. 
Record at 35-36. 
3. Eaton's old AGV and SRV product line was produced using 
six manually operated machines to complete the cutting and drilling 
tasks necessary in the production of its product. These manually 
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operated machine tools required operators to start and stop these 
tools with every tool change and every angle adjustment. These 
machine tools were incapable of cutting longer lengths of steel. 
Duplication of AGV and SRV parts using these manually operated 
machines was difficult because of the degree of variance in 
manufacturing which these manually operated machines produced. 
Record at 35-36. 
4. The old manually operated machine tools were capable of 
producing the old product line satisfactorily, but were not capable 
of producing Eaton's new product line. The new CNC machine tool 
was required in order to meet increased production schedules, 
reduce production costs, and to produce Eaton's new product line. 
In July of 1989 Eaton installed its new CNC machine following the 
retirement of its six older manually operated machine tools six 
days previous thereto. The CNC machine is a computer controlled 
machine tool. The CNC machine drills, cuts, and taps holes with 
extreme accuracy and speed. Its computer programs enable it to 
duplicate parts easily and with exactness. Eaton's CNC machine 
automatically changes drill ends without manual intervention or 
operation. 
Record at 36-37. 
5. The CNC machine has enabled Eaton to reduce its 
production time by 50%. What formerly required 15 minutes in order 
to drill or tap a hole, now requires one minute. Eaton has also 
7 
reduced its manufacturing personnel in the machine shop as a result 
of the CNC machine's multiple capabilities. 
Record at 37. 
6. The CNC machine is able to make machine parts that the 
previously operated manual machines were incapable of producing. 
The CNC machine's ability to maintain close tolerances, as demanded 
in Eaton's new product line engineering specifications, has 
permitted Eaton to develop strong, more stable and technologically 
sound AGVs and SRVs. The CNC machine also cuts longer pieces of 
steel necessary in the production of Eaton's new product line. 
Record at 37. 
7. The AGV and SRV units produced with the CNC machine are 
larger, quicker and stronger than the pre-CNC AGV and SRV units 
Eaton produced. 
Record at 37. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Commission's decision to deny Eaton a sales and use tax 
exemption under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) for Eaton's purchase 
of a new CNC machine tool is an impermissible narrowing of the 
exemption for the following reasons: 
(1) The decision is internally inconsistent. The Commission 
found the CNC machine was purchased to enable Eaton to produce a 
new product line. The Commission then concluded the CNC machine 
would not be used in a "new or expanding [manufacturing] operation" 
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because the CNC machine was used to produce the same or a similar 
product. This alone is sufficient to reverse the Commission's 
decision. 
(2) The Commission held that Eaton's new CNC machine was a 
"normal operating replacement" for six manually operated machine 
tools it replaced, in spite of the fact that the CNC machine 
performed functions the manual machines were incapable of 
performing, the CNC machine manufactured products the manual 
machines could not produce, the CNC machine significantly cut 
Eaton's costs, and the CNC machine was fifty percent (50%) more 
productive than the six manual machines it replaced. This holding 
expands the statutory term "normal operating replacement" in a way 
that effectively makes the term a "replacement." This is an 
improper rewriting of the statute and, as a result, is an arbitrary 
and unreasonable usurpation of legislative authority by the 
Commission. 
(3) The Commission's expansive interpretation of "normal 
operating replacement," and its narrow, restrictive reading and 
application of "new and expanding [manufacturing] operations" 
violates the Legislature's intent to encourage investment in 
manufacturing facilities in Utah. This, once again, is an 
usurpation of legislative authority and an unlawful act by the 
Commission. 
9 
(4) The Commission's expansion of the "normal operating 
replacements" exception to the exemption for "new or expanding 
[manufacturing] operations", in favor of taxation, violates 
recognized canons of statutory construction. Exceptions in 
derogation of exemptions should be read and construed narrowly, in 
favor of the taxpayer and the exemption, not broadly in favor of 
taxation. This is an erroneous interpretation of law by the 
Commission. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IMPERMISSIBLY NARROWS THE SALES 
TAX EXEMPTION FOR MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT PURCHASED FOR 
NEW OR EXPANDING MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS 
A. The Commission's Decision is Inconsistent With its Own 
Findings of Fact. 
The sales and use tax exemption the Commission construed in 
its decision reads as follows: 
(15) Sales or leases of machinery and 
equipment purchased or leased by a 
manufacturer for use in new or expanding 
operations (excluding normal operating 
replacements, which includes replacement 
machinery and equipment even though they may 
increase plant production or capacity, as 
determined by the Commission) in any 
manufacturing facility in Utah. Manufacturing 
facility means an establishment described in 
SIC Codes 2000 to 3999 of the 1987 Standard 
Industrial Classification Manual, of the 
Federal Executive Office of the President, 
Office of Management and Budget. For purposes 
of this subsection, the Commission shall by 
rule define "new or expanding operations" and 
"establishment." 
120837 10 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (Supp. 1993). 
In an attempt to implement this exemption, the Commission 
promulgated Rule 865-19-85S ("Rule 85S"). In that rule, the term 
"new or expanding operations" is defined as follows: 
"New or expanding operations" means 
manufacturing, processing, or assembling 
activities which: 
(a) are substantially different in 
nature, character or purpose from prior 
activities; 
(b) are begun in a new physical plant 
location in Utah; or 
(c) increase production or capacity. 
This definition is subject to limitations 
dealing with normal operating replacements. 
The term "normal operating replacements" is further defined in 
Rule 85S as: 
"Normal operating replacements" means 
machinery or equipment which replaces existing 
machinery or equipment of a similar nature, 
even if the use results in increased plant 
production or capacity. 
In this case, the Commission claimed to have applied the 
definitions promulgated in Rule 85S for "new or expanding 
operations" and "normal operating replacements" to deny Eaton the 
exemption from sales and use tax for the purchase of Eaton's CNC 
machine, even though each of the following facts applies to this 
machine: 
11 
(1) The CNC machine performs tasks which the manually 
operated machine tools it replaced were unable to perform. 
Specifically, it was able to cut longer lengths of steel than the 
machines which the CNC machine replaced. 
(2) The CNC machine enables Eaton to produce new, and 
greatly improved, AGVs and SRVs which it was unable to produce with 
its former machines. This is a new product line. 
(3) Eaton's new CNC machine permits it to produce AGVs 
and SRVs of much higher quality. 
(4) The CNC machine duplicates AGV and SRV parts easily 
and with exactness. This capacity was unavailable with Eaton's 
manually operated machine tools. 
(5) The CNC machine has reduced Eaton's production time 
by 50%, including the ability to perform a task which formerly took 
15 minutes in one minute. The CNC machine has enabled Eaton to 
significantly cut its costs to produce AGVs and SRVs. 
(6) The AGV and SRV units produced with the CNC machine 
are larger, quicker, and stronger than the AGV and SRV machine 
units produced with Eaton's pre-CNC machine tools. The CNC machine 
employs a new, and radically different technology than was employed 
in Eaton's manually controlled machine tools. The CNC machine is 
computer controlled, whereas the former machine tools were 
controlled and operated manually. The CNC machine represents a 
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quantum leap in Eaton's technology for the manufacture of AGVs and 
SRVs. 
Despite each of these undisputed facts, as found by the 
Commission, the Commission determined that Eaton's purchase of its 
CNC machine did not qualify for the exemption specified in Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) because: 
The CNC machine was not a part of a 
manufacturing, processing or assembling 
activities which are substantially different 
in nature, character, or purpose from Eaton 
Kenway's prior activities. Petitioner 
manufactured the same type of product before 
and after the purchase of the CNC machine. 
The product produced by the CNC machine was 
the same make, only a different model. 
Record at 42. 
The Commission also held that the CNC machine was "a normal 
operating replacement only and, therefore, cannot qualify for sales 
tax exemption." Record at 42. In determining that the CNC machine 
was a normal operating replacement for the manually operated 
machine tools, the Commission necessarily found that the CNC 
machine "replaces existing machinery or equipment of a similar 
nature." 
The Commission's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
internally inconsistent. Having found that Eaton's new CNC machine 
produced a "new product line," the Commission nonetheless concluded 
that the CNC machine produced the "same product." The 
inconsistency between the Commission's Findings of Fact and 
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Conclusions of Law are apparent, and of itself sufficient grounds 
for reversal as an arbitrary agency action. 
B. The Commission's Decision Rewrites the Statute by 
Effectively Eliminating "Normal Operating" From the 
Statutory Language "Normal Operating Replacements." 
The Commission's Conclusion of Law that Eaton is not entitled 
to the exemption under Section 59-12-104(15) is wrong for two 
additional reasons. First, the Commission's definition of "normal 
operating replacement" in Rule 85S is not a reasonable 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. Section 59-12-104(15); it is, 
instead, an abuse of discretion since it defines "normal operating 
replacement" in an arbitrary and unreasonable fashion, and in 
complete disregard of the Legislature's intent. Second, even 
assuming Rule 85S is a reasonable interpretation of Section 59-12-
104(15), the Commission disregarded its own rule in denying Eaton 
the tax exemption it sought. 
Rule 85S is void as an unreasonable interpretation of Section 
59-12-104(15) because it disregards the statutory words "normal 
operating" in defining "normal operating replacements." In 
adopting Rule 85S and construing it to include all replacements, 
the Commission has, in effect, deleted "normal operating" from the 
statutory term "normal operating replacements." Under either a 
correction of error standard, or an abuse of discretion standard, 
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the Commission's disregard of the words "normal operating" in 
defining "normal operating replacements" is reversible error.2 
To illustrate, the Commission found that Eaton's CNC machine 
is a normal operating replacement simply because it is similar in 
nature and purpose to Eaton's former manually operated machine 
tools. There is no mention, either in Rule 85S or in the 
Commission's application of it, that "normal operating 
replacements" means to replace machinery and equipment that is worn 
out through normal usage. Essentially, under the Commission's 
rationale, a personal computer is the equivalent of, or a normal 
operating replacement for, a manual typewriter because both 
machines produce documents. Such a result badly distorts the plain 
meaning of "normal operating replacements" as contemplated in Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15). 
An obvious source for determining what the Legislature 
intended by the terms "normal operating replacements" - one which 
the Legislature would have had available and would likely have 
used is a dictionary. Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary, Merriam-Webster (1971), page 1540, defines the term 
"normal" in the following fashion: 
2
 Amici views "an abuse of discretion" standard of review as being a 
higher, or more rigorous, standard than is a "correction of error" standard of 
review. Thus if the Commission has violated the "abuse of discretion" standard 
of review by acting unreasonably, the Commission will also have committed an 
error of law requiring correction by the court. 
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According to, constituting, or not deviating 
from an established norm, rule, or principle 
[normal working hours] . . . consistent with 
the social norm [normal married life]. 
It then states that a synonym for "normal" is "regular." Regular 
is defined in the same dictionary at page 1913, as being "standard, 
or correct." 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary at page 1581 also 
defines the term "operating" as follows: 
Arising out of or concerned with the current 
operations of a concern engaged in 
transportation or manufacturing as distinct 
from its financial transactions, and its 
permanent improvements. 
Thus, what the Legislature meant when it used the term "normal 
operating replacements" is "according to an established norm" and 
"arising out of current operations." It did not mean to sweep all 
"replacements" within the scope of "normal operating replacements," 
thereby making any replacement machinery ineligible for the 
exemption. 
Even assuming Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) gives the 
Commission authority to determine what constitutes "normal 
operating replacements," this discretion is not unlimited. The 
Commission cannot define "black" as if the statute had said 
"white." Instead the Commission's rule must be within the scope of 
the Legislature's intention in adopting the statute. For example, 
in Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Division of the Utah State Tax 
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Commission, 846 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1993) the Utah Supreme Court held 
invalid a provision of Rule 85S which required that a manufacturer 
produce a new product in order to qualify as a "manufacturer" under 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15). In so holding, the court stated: 
It is a long-standing principle of 
administrative law that an agency's rules must 
be consistent with its governing statutes. 
[Citations omitted.] Thus, a rule out of 
harmony with the governing statute is invalid. 
[Citations omitted. ] 
Id., 846 P.2d at 1306.3 
The Commission's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Rule 85S in t h i s case to 
deny Eaton an exemption from Utah sa les and use taxes i s "out of 
harmony with the governing s t a t u t e , " i . e . Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
104(15). The Commission has adopted a function t e s t . Any time a 
machine, such as Eaton's ANC machine, replaces a machine which 
performs a s imi la r function, the exemption i s not ava i l ab l e . This 
cannot be what the Legis la ture intended when i t used the term 
"normal operating replacements." If the Legis la ture had intended 
the r e s u l t which the Commission applied to Eaton in t h i s case, the 
s t a t u t e would not exclude from the exemption "normal operat ing 
3
 In Sanders the Commission a t tempted t o narrow the exemption of Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) by de f in ing "manufacturer" as a "person who . . . 
produces a new . . . p r o d u c t . " The cour t he ld t h i s t o be an impermiss ib le 
r e s t r i c t i o n on the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the exemption. In t h i s case the Commission 
has once again r e i n s t a t e d the requirement t h a t a person may not q u a l i f y for the 
exemption i f he does not produce a "new product" by de f in ing a "new or expanding 
ope ra t ion" as exc luding those manufacturers who do not produce a "new p r o d u c t . " 
See p . 10 of the Decis ion and Order and Commissioner S h e a r e r ' s d i s s e n t a t p . 12 
of the Decis ion and Order. Record a t 42 & 44. Once again the Commission has 
g r a f t e d onto the s t a t u t e a requirement not inc luded by the L e g i s l a t u r e and the 
Commission should be r e v e r s e d . 
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replacements," but would simply exclude any machinery in a new or 
expanding operation which is a "replacement" for existing 
machinery. 
In Newspaper Agency Corporation v. Auditing Division, 93-0328 
(appeal pending in this court under No. 940170), Commissioner Alice 
Shearer aptly noted her fellow Commissioners7 error in distorting 
the language of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) to exclude all 
replacements from eligibility for the exemption, when only "normal 
operating replacements" should be ineligible. She said in dissent: 
NAC has established by uncontroverted 
testimony and evidence that the expenditures 
in question do not constitute "normal 
operating replacements". The demonstrated 
increases in production, capacity and 
capability, noted in paragraphs 15 and 16 of 
the majority decision's findings of fact, 
exceed those that would be an incidental and 
anticipated result of replacing equipment that 
is obsolete and/or worn out. 
Id. Decision and Order at 19-20 (emphasis added). 
Commissioner Shearer's definition of "normal operating 
replacements" in NAC is a reasonable definition; that is, "normal 
operating replacements" are an incidental result of replacing 
obsolete or worn-out equipment which has outlived its useful life. 
A typical scenario in which that may happen is the replacement of 
a fan belt that has worn out through usage. Conversely, machinery 
which substantially outperforms existing machinery with significant 
remaining useful life cannot be a "normal operating replacement." 
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In this case, Eaton's CNC machine is not an incidental or 
anticipated replacement of the six manual machines, each of which 
had significant remaining useful life. It was instead a new and 
innovative method of expanding production. 
Eaton's CNC machine is not a "normal operating replacement" 
within the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory words. The 
machine was purchased to produce a new product line and for the 
modernization and upgrading of Eaton's facilities. It was not 
purchased for use in Eaton's then current operations. 
Consequently, it could not properly or reasonably be considered a 
"normal operating replacements." 
C. The Commission Has Not Followed its Own Rule. 
Again assuming Rule 85S legitimately defines "normal operating 
replacements" as all replacements, the Commission's decision is 
erroneous because it insists that Eaton manufacture a "new product" 
when the rule contains no such requirement. The Commission's 
Decision and Order stresses that Eaton "manufactured the same type 
of product both before and after the purchase of the CNC machine," 
and that the CNC machine produced the "same" product, only "a 
different model." 
Record at 42. 
However, Rule 85S does not include a "new product" test. 
Instead, the rule provides that "New or expanding operations' means 
manufacturing, processing, or assembling activities, which: (a) are 
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substantially different in nature, character, or purpose from prior 
activities." (Emphasis added.) Further assuming this definition 
of "new or expanding" is not unreasonably restrictive, it 
nonetheless focuses on manufacturing activities or processes, not 
new products. Therefore, a manufacturer should be eligible for the 
exemption if his manufacturing activities or processes are 
substantially different in nature, character, or purpose, even 
though the end product is precisely the same. 
In this case below, Commissioner Alice Shearer made the same 
point in dissenting from the majority holding. Her dissent states: 
I do not think the fact that Petitioner 
continued to produce the same type of product 
after acquiring the CNC machine should be 
controlling in this case. What is of more 
significance is how the CNC machine changed 
the manufacturing process at Eaton Kenway. As 
a result of new research in technology and 
engineering, Petitioner was ready to build a 
new, far-superior product line. A new 
manufacturing process was necessary. The CNC 
machine is the new process, substantially 
different in character and nature from the 
former manufacturing process. Eaton Kenway 
could not produce this new product without the 
CNC machine. 
Record at 44. 
and further: 
I do not think that allowing the manufacturer 
sales tax exemption in this case is the result 
of a broad interpretation of the statute and 
rule. Rather, granting the exemption in these 
120837 20 
circumstances is exactly what the statute was 
envisioned to permit. 
Record at 45. 
As demonstrated above, the Commission's Rule 85S is an abuse 
of discretion since it arbitrarily defines "normal operating 
replacements" as all replacements. The Commission has also acted 
contrary to its own rule by insisting that Eaton satisfy a "new 
product" test which is not contained in the Commission's own rule. 
II. THE COMMISSION'S EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF "NORMAL OPERATING 
REPLACEMENT, " AND ITS NARROW INTERPRETATION OF "NEW OR 
EXPANDING OPERATIONS" VIOLATES LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO ENCOURAGE 
INVESTMENT AND CANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 
Amici recognize that exemptions from taxation should be 
construed strictly. If a taxpayer is unable to demonstrate 
entitlement to the exemption, it is not available. However, this 
rule should not be employed to defeat the intended purpose of the 
statute. "Although exemptions from taxation are generally 
construed narrowly, they should, nonetheless, be construed with 
sufficient latitude to accomplish the intended purpose." Utah 
County v. Intermountam Health Care, Inc., 725 P.2d 1357, 1359 
(Utah 1986) . This overall subordination of exemptions to statutory 
intent is explained in 54 ALR3d, Tax Exemption -- Available to 
Lessee, 402, 414 & 415, as follows: 
However, the rule of strict construction is 
subordinate to the rule of legislative intent, 
which is the supreme rule of construction, and 
courts adhering to the rule of strict 
construction have pointed out that tax 
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exemptions must still be given a reasonable, 
natural and practical, and not an unreasonably 
narrow, interpretation in light of modern 
conditions in order to effectuate the purpose 
for which the exemption is granted. 
It is obvious that the intent of the Legislature in granting 
the exemption contained in Section 59-12-104(15), supra, is to 
encourage investment in new and expanding manufacturing operations 
in Utah, so that Utah could compete with other states in attracting 
manufacturing facilities.4 
In this case, the Commission promulgated Rule 85S, arbitrarily 
defining the term "normal operating replacement," and then applied 
that definition to Eaton in a way which defeats the Legislature's 
purpose of encouraging investment in new and expanding 
manufacturing operations in Utah. Eaton has made a significant 
investment in its CNC machine to upgrade and modernize its 
manufacturing facilities. The investment gives Eaton new capacity, 
and new ability, to produce superior products it was previously 
incapable of producing. This is exactly what the exemption is 
designed to encourage so that Utah's manufacturers can meet 
increased competition from manufacturers located outside this 
4
 See Due & Mikesell, "Sales Taxation, State and Local Structure and 
Administration," (1983) at p. 57 where it states: 
General exemption of industrial machinery obviously has 
merit, under the principle that producers goods should 
not be subject to tax. Taxation of such equipment 
places a tax penalty on investment. If some states 
exempt it, industrial development in the states that do 
not may be restricted, though no concrete evidence is 
available. 
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state. The Commission's broad interpretation of "normal operating 
replacement" is contrary to this legislative intent. 
The Commission's interpretation of "normal operating 
replacements" is also contrary to accepted canons for statutory 
construction of exceptions to exemptions. An exception to an 
exemption exists, as is the case with Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
104(15), when there is an exception ("normal operating 
replacements") to an otherwise exempt purchase (new machinery or 
equipment). These exceptions should be construed in favor of the 
taxpayer so that those who qualify for the exemption may claim it 
except in narrow and specifically defined circumstances. This 
exception to an exemption rule of statutory construction is 
explained in the Matter of Fasi, 634 P.2d 98 (Hi. 1981). In that 
case the Hawaii Supreme Court construed a tax exemption, and an 
exception to the exemption. The court stated: 
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that 
the rule of strict construction is applicable 
in tax cases and that, "if doubt exists as to 
the construction of a taxing statute, the 
doubt should be resolved in favor of the 
taxpayer." [Citation omitted.] " [I]t is also 
equally well established that exemptions from 
taxation are strictly construed against the 
taxpayer." [Citation omitted.] "The statute 
in question is not an exemption from taxation 
but an exception from such an exemption. We 
hold that a statute which creates an exception 
to a well-established statutory tax exemption 
should be construed in favor of the taxpayer 
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where the language creating a tax liability is 
ambiguous." 
Id., at 103. 
The Eaton case presents to this court a case similar to that 
the Hawaii Supreme Court addressed in Fasi. This court must 
determine if the exemption from Utah sales tax is available for 
Eaton's purchase of its CNC machine. The exemption for the CNC 
machine is generally available because purchase of the machine is 
indisputably part of a new or expanding manufacturing operation. 
The only limitation, or exception, to this available exemption is 
for "normal operating replacements," which, following Fasi, should 
be narrowly construed so as to give the taxpayer the benefit of any 
ambiguity. Instead, the Commission construed the "normal operating 
replacements" exception broadly, that is, in favor of taxation, 
thereby violating the principle that exceptions to exemptions 
should be narrowly construed. 
CONCLUSION 
Eaton has wrongfully been denied a sales tax exemption to 
which it is entitled. The court should reverse the Commission's 
decision and remand the case with directions that the Commission 
grant Eaton the exemption for its purchase of its CNC machine under 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15), supra for the 
following reasons. 
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1. The Commission has acted unreasonably in promulgating Rule 
85S to include all replacements rather than "normal operating 
replacements" as an exception to the exemption otherwise available 
to taxpayers under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15). 
2. Even assuming Rule 85S is not an abuse of discretion, the 
Commission wrongly insisted that Eaton satisfy a "new products" 
test under the rule when no such test is enunciated or authorized 
in the rule. 
3. The Commission's broad construction of "normal operating 
replacements" to include all replacements violates the 
Legislature's intent to promote investment in manufacturing by this 
exemption. 
4. The Commission wrongly construed the "normal operating 
replacements" exception to the exemption otherwise available to 
Eaton under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) broadly, in favor of 
taxation, rather than narrowly in favor of taxpayer eligibility for 
the exemption. 
120837 25 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1994. 
CENT W. WINTERHOLLER 
MAXWELL A. MILLER 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
The Utah Taxpayer's Association 
The Utah Manufacturer's Association 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
26 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this <*Z—day of July, 1994, I 
caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE THE UTAH 
TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION AND THE UTAH MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, to: 
Susan Barnum 
Assistant Utah Attorney 
General Tax & Business 
Regulation Division 
Utah State Attorney General's Office 
55 South Main Street 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
F. LaVar Christensen 
7050 So. Union Park Avenue 
Suite 420 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
27 
Addenda 
59-1-610. Standard of review of appellate court. 
(1) When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings commenced before the 
commission, the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court shall: 
(a) grant the commission deference concerning its written findings of 
fact, applying a substantial evidence standard on review; and 
(b) grant the commission no deference concerning its conclusions of 
law, applying a correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit 
grant of discretion contained in a statute at issue before the appellate 
court. 
(2) This section supercedes Section 63-46b-16 pertaining to judicial review 
of formal adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 59-1-610, enacted by L. came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1993, ch. 248, § 4. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 248 be-
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59-12-104. Exemptions. 
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes imposed by this 
chapter: 
(1) sales of aviation fuel, motor fuel, and special fuel subject to a Utah 
state excise tax under Title 59, Chapter 13, Motor and Special Fuel Tax 
Act; 
(2) sales to the state, its institutions, and its political subdivisions; 
(3) sales of food, beverage, and dairy products from vending machines 
in which the proceeds of each sale do not exceed $1 if the vendor or 
operator of the vending machine reports an amount equal to 120% of the 
cost of items as goods consumed; 
(4) sales of food, beverage, dairy products, similar confections, and re-
lated services to commercial airline carriers for in-flight consumption; 
(5) sales of parts and equipment installed in aircraft operated by com-
mon carriers in interstate or foreign commerce; 
(6) sales of commercials, motion picture films, prerecorded audio pro-
gram tapes or records, and prerecorded video tapes by a producer, distrib-
utor, or studio to a motion picture exhibitor, distributor, or commercial 
television or radio broadcaster; 
(7) sales made through coin-operated laundry machines, coin-operated 
dry cleaning machines, or coin-operated car washes; 
(8) sales made to or by religious or charitable institutions in the con-
duct of their regular religious or charitable functions and activities and, 
after July 1, 1993, if the requirements of Section 59-12-104.1 are fulfilled; 
(9) sales of vehicles of a type required to be registered under the motor 
vehicle laws of this state which are made to bona fide nonresidents of this 
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state and are not afterwards registered or used in this state except as 
necessary to transport them to the borders of this state; 
(10) sales of medicine; 
(11) sales or use of property, materials, or services used in the con-
struction of or incorporated in pollution control facilities allowed by Sec-
tions 19-2-123 through 19-2-127; 
(12) sales or use of property which the state is prohibited from taxing 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States or under the laws of 
this state; 
(13) sales of meals served by: 
(a) public elementary and secondary schools; 
(b) churches, charitable institutions, and institutions of higher ed-
ucation, if the meals are not available to the general public; and 
(c) inpatient meals provided at medical or nursing facilities; 
(14) isolated or occasional sales by persons not regularly engaged in 
business, except the sale of vehicles or vessels required to be titled or 
registered under the laws of this state; 
(15) sales or leases of machinery and equipment purchased or leased by 
a manufacturer for use in new or expanding operations (excluding normal 
operating replacements, which includes replacement machinery and 
equipment even though they may increase plant production or capacity, 
as determined by the commission) in any manufacturing facility in Utah. 
Manufacturing facility means an establishment described in SIC Codes 
2000 to 3999 of the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification Manual, of 
the federal Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and 
Budget. For purposes of this subsection, the commission shall by rule 
define "new or expanding operations" and "establishment." By October 1, 
1991, and every five years thereafter, the commission shall review this 
exemption and make recommendations to the Revenue and Taxation In-
terim Committee concerning whether the exemption should be continued, 
modified, or repealed. In its report to the Revenue and Taxation Interim 
Committee, the tax commission review shall include at least: 
(a) the cost of the exemption; 
(b) the purpose and effectiveness of the exemption; and 
(c) the benefits of the exemption to the state; 
(16) sales of tooling, special tooling, support equipment, and special 
test equipment used or consumed exclusively in the performance of any 
aerospace or electronics industry contract with the United States govern-
ment or any subcontract under that contract, but only if, under the terms 
of that contract or subcontract, title to the tooling and equipment is 
vested in the United States government as evidenced by a government 
identification tag placed on the tooling and equipment or by listing on a 
government-approved property record if a tag is impractical; 
(17) intrastate movements of freight and express or street railway 
fares: 
(18) sales of newspapers or newspaper subscriptions; 
(19) tangible personal property, other than money, traded in as full or 
part payment of the purchase price, except that for purposes of calculat-
ing sales or use tax upon vehicles not sold by a vehicle dealer, trade-ins 
are limited to other vehicles only, and the tax is based upon the then 
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existing fair market value of the vehicle being sold and the vehicle being 
traded in, as determined by the commission, 
(20) sprays and insecticides used to control insects, diseases, and weeds 
for commercial production of fruits, vegetables, feeds, seeds, and animal 
products, 
(21) sales of tangible personal property used or consumed primarily 
and directly in farming opeiations, including sales of irrigation equip-
ment and supplies used for agricultural production purposes, whether or 
not they become part of real estate and whether or not installed by 
farmer, contractor, or subcontractor, but not sales of 
(a) machinery, equipment, materials, and supplies used in a man-
ner tha t is incidental to farming, such as hand tools with a unit 
purchase price not in excess of $100, and maintenance and janitorial 
equipment and supplies, 
(b) tangible personal property used in any activities other than 
farming, such as office equipment and supplies, equipment and sup-
plies used in sales or distribution of farm products, in research, or in 
transportation, or 
(c) any vehicle required to be registered by the laws of this state, 
without regard to the use to which the vehicle is put, 
(22) seasonal sales of crops, seedling plants, or garden, farm, or other 
agricultural produce if sold by the producer, 
(23) purchases of food made with food stamps, 
(24) any container, label, shipmng case, or, in the case of meat or meat 
products, any casing, 
(25) property stored in the state for resale, 
(26) property brought into the state by a nonresident for his or her own 
personal use or enjoyment while within the state, except property pur-
chased for use in Utah by a nonresident living and working in Utah at the 
time of purchase, 
(27) property purchased for resale in this state, in the regular course of 
business, either in its original form or as an ingredient or component part 
of a manufactured or compounded product, 
(28) property upon which a sales or use tax was paid to some other 
state, or one of its subdivisions except that the state shall be paid any 
difference between the tax paid and the tax imposed by this part and Part 
2, and no adjustment is allowed if the tax paid was greater than the tax 
imposed by this part and Part 2, 
(29) any sale of a service described in Subsections 59-12-103(l)(b), (c), 
and (d) to a person for use in compounding a service taxable under the 
subsections, 
(30) purchases of food made under the WIC program of the United 
States Department of Agriculture, 
(31) sales or leases made after July 1, 1987, and before June 30, 1996, 
of rolls, rollers, refractory brick, electric motors, and other replacement 
parts used in the furnaces, mills, and ovens of a steel mill described in 
SIC Code 3312 of the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification Manual, of 
the federal Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and 
Budget, but only if the steel mill was a nonproducing Utah facility pur-
chased and reopened for the production of steel, 
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(32) sales of boats of a type required to be registered under Title 73, 
Chapter 18, State Boating Act, boat trailers, and outboard motors which 
are made to bona fide nonresidents of this state and are not thereafter 
registered or used in this state except as necessary to transport them to 
the borders of this state; 
(33) sales of tangible personal property to persons within this state 
that is subsequently shipped outside the state and incorporated pursuant 
to contract into and becomes a part of real property located outside of this 
state, except to the extent that the other state or political entity imposes a 
sales, use, gross receipts, or other similar transaction excise tax on it 
against which the other state or political entity allows a credit for taxes 
imposed by this chapter; 
(34) sales of aircraft manufactured in Utah if sold for delivery and use 
outside Utah where a sales or use tax is not imposed, even if the title is 
passed in Utah; and 
(35) until July 1, 1999, amounts paid for purchase of telephone service 
for purposes of providing telephone service. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 63, § 6; 1933 (2nd 
S.S.), ch. 20, § 1; 1939, ch. 103, § 1; C. 1943, 
80-15-6; 1945, ch. 110, § 1; 1957, ch. 126, § 1; 
1957, ch. 127, § 1; 1965, ch. 128, § 1; 1967, 
ch. 162, § 1; 1969, ch. 187, § 3; 1969 (1st 
S.S.), ch. 14, § 3; 1973, ch. 42, § 9; 1973, ch. 
154, § 1; 1975, ch. 179, fc 2; 1976, ch. 28, § 1; 
1979, ch. 195, § 1; 1981, ch. 238, * 1; 1981, 
ch. 239, * 2; 1982, ch. 70, § 1; 1983, ch. 264, 
§ 1; 1983, ch. 281, * 1; 1983 (1st S.S.), ch. 6, 
§ 2; 1984, ch. 59, § 1; 1984, ch. 60, § 1; 1985, 
ch. 80, § 3; 1986, ch. 9, § 1; 1986, ch. 55, § 6; 
1986, ch. 99, § 1; 1986, ch. 134, § 1; 1986, ch. 
168, * 1; C. 1953, 59-15-6; r e n u m b e r e d by L. 
1987, ch. 5, * 26; 1987, ch. 51, * 1; 1987 (1st 
S.S.), ch . 10, H 1, 2; 1988, ch. 58, § 1; 1988, 
ch. 66, § 2; 1988, ch. 69, * 1; 1989, ch. 89, * 1; 
ANALYSIS 
"Consumption " 
Intrastate movement of freight 
Real property 
Registered vehicle 
—Sale to nonresident. 
"Consumption." 
Steel manufacturers who lance pipes, stir-
ring lances, and mill rolls primarily for their 
use as equipment and onk incidentally for 
their use as ingredients in the manufacturing 
process are liable for sales and use taxes on the 
items Nucor Corp v Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
187 Utah Adv Rep 17 (1992) 
Intrastate movement of freight. 
Subsection (17), providing for a sales tax ex-
emption for intrastate movements of freight, is 
limited to common carriers and does not pro-
1989, ch. 169, § 1; 1989, ch. 247, § 1; 1990, 
ch. 22, § 2; 1990, ch. 36, § 1; 1991, ch. 5, § 57; 
1991, ch. I l l , § 1; 1991, ch. 112, § 216; 1992, 
ch. 66, § 3; 1992, ch. 298, § 2; 1993, ch. 166, 
§ 1; 1993, ch. 296, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment by ch. 166, effective May 3, 1993, substi-
tuted "sales of aviation fuel, motor fuel, and 
special fuel" for "sales of motor fuels and spe-
cial fuels" in Subsection (1). 
The 1993 amendment by ch. 296, effective 
May 3, 1993, substituted "1996" for "1994" in 
Subsection (31). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel 
vide an exemption for intrastate delivery made 
by the seller in its own trucks Hales Sand & 
Gravel, Inc v Auditing Div., 200 Utah Adv. 
Rep 3 (1992) 
Real property. 
Where, under its sales contracts, an Illinois 
corporation fabricated, erected, and installed 
on its customers' real property large tanks that 
were not readily removable, and it was not in-
tended that they be moveable or removed, then 
the installed tanks, once attached, were real 
property and the corporation was a real prop-
erty contractor, not a manufacturer, and was 
not eligible for :t»e exemption for materials 
used in manufacturing Chicago Bridge & Iron 
Co v State Tax Comm'n, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 
18 (1992) 
Where an Illinois corporation's customers in-
tended to purchase fully assembled tanks per-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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manently installed on real estate, whether 
that real estate was located in Utah or another 
state was not relevant as to the corporation's 
status as a real property contractor. Chicago 
Bridge & Iron Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 196 
Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (1992). 
Registered vehicle. 
— Sale to nonresident. 
While taxpayer's legal residence created a 
legitimate source of dispute, because he main-
tained a registered vehicle with Utah desig-
nated as home state and allowed a vehicle to be 
kept or used by a Utah resident, the State Tax 
Commission reasonably found that the tax-
payer had resident status for sales tax pur-
poses and thus was disqualified from claiming 
the nonresident exemption Putvin v Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 63 (Ct. 
App. 1992). 
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Rft65-19-K4S Tax Commission Rules CODE 1993 
R865-19-&5S. Machinery and Equipment 
Exemption For Use i s Certain Manufacturing 
Facilities Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 
59-12-104. 
A. Definitions: 
1. "Machinery" means electronic or mechanical 
machines incorporated into a manufactunng or 
assembling process from the initial suge where 
actual processing begins through the completion of 
the finished end product, including final processing, 
finishing or packaging of articles which are sold as 
tangible personal property. 
Automated material handling and storage machi-
nery is included in this definition when such mach-
inery is part of the integrated continuous production 
cycle. 
2. "Equipment* means any independent device 
separate from any machinery but essential to an 
integrated or continuous manufacturing or assembly 
process or any subunit comprising a component of 
any machinery or auxiliary thereof, including such 
items as dies, jigs, patterns, molds, and similar 
Utah Tax Code CODE• Co Prove. Uuk 
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CODE 1993 Tax Comm 
items used in manufacturing, processing, or assem-
bling. Qualifying equipment also includes devices 
necessary to the control or operation of machinery 
and equipment qualifying under this rule even 
though not located in the specific manufacturing 
area. 
3. 'New or expanding operations" means man-
ufacturing, processing, or assembling activities 
which: 
a) are substantially different in nature, character, 
or purpose from prior activities; 
b) are begun in a new physical plant location in 
Utah; or 
c) increase production or capacity. This definition 
is subject to limitations dealing with normal opera-
ting replacements. 
4. 'Manufacturer* means a person who: 
a) functions within the activities included in SIC 
code classification 2000 - 3999; 
b) produces a new, reconditioned, or remanufac-
tured product, article, substance, or commodity 
from raw, semi-finished, or used material; and 
c) in the normal course of business produces 
products which are sold as tangible personal prop-
erty. 
5. "Establishment" means an economic unit of 
operations that is generally at a single physical loc-
ation in Utah where qualifying manufacturing acti-
vities are performed. Where distinct and separate 
economic activities are performed at a single phys-
ical location, each activity should be treated as a 
separate establishment. 
6. "Normal operating replacements" means 
machinery or equipment which replaces existing 
machinery or equipment of a similar nature, even if 
the use results in increased plant production or 
capacity. 
(a) If new machinery or equipment is purchased 
or leased which has the same or similar purpose as 
machinery or equipment retired from service within 
12 months before or after the purchase date, such 
machinery or equipment is considered as replace-
ment and is not exempt. 
b) If existing machinery or equipment is kept for 
back-up or infrequent use; new, similar machinery 
or equipment purchased would be considered as 
replacement and is not exempt. 
7. "Improvement" is defined in Utah Code Ann. 
Section 59-2-102(3). 
B. Application of Exemption: 
1. The machinery and equipment exemption 
applies only to tangible personal property. It does 
not apply to real property or to tangible personal 
property which is purchased and becomes an impr-
ovement to real property. The exemption does not 
apply to charges for labor to repair, renovate, or 
clean machinery or equipment. 
2. Machinery or equipment used for an activity 
which is not part of the manufacturing process, such 
as research and development; refrigerated or other 
storage of raw materials, component parts, or the 
finished product; or shipping the finished product is 
not exempt. 
3. Machinery or equipment with a useful econ-
omic and/or accounting life of less than three years 
is not eligible for the exemption. 
4. Machinery or equipment purchased or leased 
for use in activities which may qualify it for exem-
ption, as well as in other activities, will not lose the 
exemption if the use in nonqualifying activities is 
determined to be de minimis. Nonqualifying activi-
ties are activities such as maintenance or production 
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of tangible personal property that is not sold in 
arms-length transactions. 
5. Sales of manufactured tangible personal prop-
erty may be at retail as defined in rule R865-19-
27S or at wholesale as defined in rule R865-19-
29S, but they must be arms-length sales for the 
exemption to qualify. An arms-length sale is 
defined as a transaction that occurs in an open 
market, between unrelated parties and neither party 
is under duress to buy or sell. 
6. The manufacturer shall retain records to 
support the claim that the machinery and equipment 
are qualified for exemption under the provisions of 
this rule. 
7. A person may seek a declaratory judgment 
according to Tax Commission Rule R861-1-5A to 
determine whether any particular purchase or lease 
qualifies for this particular exemption. If denied, the 
Tax Commission may grant a hearing to reconsider 
the request for a declaratory judgment under the 
provisions of Rule R861-1-13A. 
8. Exemption will be allowed for any qualified 
purchase or lease if delivery to the buyer or to a 
carrier for shipment to the buyer or lessee, takes 
place on or after July 1,1985. 
C. Vendors are required to obtain a tax exemp-
tion certificate upon which the purchaser certifies 
that the use of the machinery or equipment qualifies 
for exemption under Utah Code Ann. Title 59, 
Chapter 12. 
D. The effective date of this rule is July 1,1991. 
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